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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to clarify how best to interpret some of the central constructs that 
underwrite the free-energy principle (FEP) – and its corollary, active inference – in 
theoretical neuroscience and biology: namely, the role that generative models and variational 
densities play in this theory. We argue that these constructs have been systematically 
misrepresented in the literature; because of the conflation between the FEP and active 
inference, on the one hand, and distinct (albeit closely related) Bayesian formulations, 
centred on the brain – variously known as predictive processing, predictive coding, or the 
prediction error minimisation framework. More specifically, we examine two contrasting 
interpretations of these models: a structural representationalist interpretation and an enactive 
interpretation. We argue that the structural representationalist interpretation of generative and 
recognition models does not do justice to the role that these constructs play in active 
inference under the FEP. We propose an enactive interpretation of active inference – what 
might be called enactive inference. In active inference under the FEP, the generative and 
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recognition models are best cast as realising inference and control – the self-organising, 
belief-guided selection of action policies – and do not have the properties ascribed by 
structural representationalists. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to clarify how best to interpret some of the central constructs that 
underwrite the free-energy principle (FEP) – and its corollary, active inference – in 
theoretical neuroscience and biology: namely, the role that generative models and recognition 
densities1 play in this theory, aiming to unify life and mind (Friston, 2013; Kirchhoff, Parr, 
Palacios, Friston, & Kiverstein, 2018; Ramstead, Badcock, & Friston, 2018). We argue that 
these central constructs have been systematically misrepresented in the literature; because of 
the conflation between active inference, on the one hand, and distinct (albeit closely related) 
Bayesian formulations, centred on the brain – variously known as predictive processing 
(Clark, 2013, 2015; Metzinger & Wiese, 2017), predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999), or 
the prediction error minimisation framework (Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018, 2019).  
 
These latter approaches have much in common with active inference, and together constitute 
what might be called Bayesian cognitive science. The idea behind these Bayesian approaches 
is, in a nutshell, that cognitive processes are underwritten by predictions based on inferential 
models. Central among these models are generative models – that is, statistical models of how 
sensory observations are generated, which harness the prior beliefs (i.e., probability densities) 
of a cognitive system about its environment. In Bayesian cognitive science, these generative 
models are said to work in tandem with recognition models – which harness posterior beliefs 
that represent the system’s observationally informed ‘best guess’ about the causes of its 
sensations. Bayesian schemes treat cognitive activity as inferring a posterior probability 
distribution (a guess about the causes of sensory states – the recognition density) via a 
process of belief updating – essentially, changing prior beliefs (from the generative model) 
into a posterior belief, by assimilating new observations or sensory evidence.  
 
The question that shall occupy us is how best to understand the function and properties of the 
generative and recognition models in active inference under the FEP, in light of the active 
processes involved in orchestrating, maintaining, and updating these models. In particular, we 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we will use recognition density to mean an approximate posterior density or variational density 
that corresponds to a Bayesian or posterior belief – in the sense of (non-propositional) belief updating or belief 
propagation. Furthermore, we will read model as implicitly probabilistic – so that the recognition model 
becomes a recognition density. 
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examine two contrasting interpretations of these models: a structural representationalist 
interpretation and an enactive interpretation.  
 
Recent work on the Bayesian approach casts generative models (and associated recognition 
densities) as structural representations – that is, as “iconic representations in which the 
structure of internal representations in the brain come to replicate the structure of the 
generative process by which sensory input impinges upon it” (Williams & Colling, 2017, p. 
1962). The most engaging recent defence of structural representationalism, which will be our 
target, have been provided by Clark (2015); Gładziejewski (2016); Gładziejewski and 
Miłkowski (2017); Hohwy (2014, 2016); Kiefer and Hohwy (2018, 2019); Williams (2017); 
Williams and Colling (2017). On this view, cognitive processes are seen as irreducibly 
involving internal, neural structures that carry representational content, and which acquire 
their contents via inferential processes in the hierarchical generative and recognition models 
that are instantiated by the brain. 
 
We argue that the structural representationalist interpretation of generative and recognition 
models – while providing an accurate description of these constructs as they figure in some 
versions of Bayesian cognitive science – does not do justice to the generative models and 
recognition densities that figure in active inference under the FEP. In contrast to these other 
Bayesian theories, which are, in effect, theories of the structure, function and dynamics of the 
brain, active inference is a much broader theory of adaptive phenotypes, that centres on the 
control of adaptive behaviour and that emphasises the tight coupling and circular causality 
between perception and action.  
 
The enactive interpretation of active inference that we pursue takes seriously the idea that 
active inference is a self-organising process of action policy selection. When understood as a 
self-organised policy selection, active inference has the following non-trivial implication. 
Active inference is not merely a view of the brain as reducing the uncertainty of its sensory 
observations via perceptual inference. It concerns the active, selective sampling of the world 
by an embodied agent. From a technical point of view, active inference and perceptual 
inference are not merely two sides of the same coin. Rather, active inference is the name of 
the formulation for policy selection. What advocates of the Bayesian brain call “perceptual 
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inference” is just one moment of the policy selection process in active inference under the 
FEP, namely, state estimation. The issue we want to press here is that the active inference 
framework implies that perception is a form of action, i.e., action and perception cannot be 
pulled apart as they sometimes are in the Bayesian brain framework. 
 
In this sense, the active inference scheme is enactive (Thompson, 2010; Varela, Thompson, 
& Rosch, 1991), in the enactive sense of being for action (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014; 
Kirchhoff, 2018; Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017; Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019; Ramstead et al., 
2018; Ramstead, Kirchhoff, Constant, & Friston, 2019). Our enactive interpretation of active 
inference – what might be called enactive inference – follows what has been called the 
pragmatic turn in cognitive science (Engel, Friston, & Kragic, 2016). In cognitive science, 
this is the move away from a view of cognition as the rule-governed manipulation of internal 
(often symbolic) representations, to a view of cognition as being essentially action-oriented, 
and therefore premised on the selection of adequate forms of situationally appropriate action.    
 
We proceed differently from much of the literature discussing this question, in that we base 
our interpretation of generative and recognition models directly on the mathematical 
apparatus of active inference. Namely, we examine the FEP and active inference as applied to 
the selection of adaptive action policies – in contrast to other approaches that focus on the 
Bayesian brain and predictive coding, e.g., Clark (2015); Hohwy (2014). In active inference 
under the FEP, the generative and recognition models are best cast as realising inference and 
control – the belief-guided selection of action policies – and do not have the properties 
ascribed by structural representationalists. We thus provide a philosophical and information-
theoretic justification for an enactive view of generative models under the FEP. 
 
The argumentative structure of this paper is as follows. In the first section, we present the 
generative and recognition models, as they figure in Bayesian cognitive science – and 
examine the claim that these inferential models are structural representations. In the second 
section, we present the FEP and active inference. In the third section, we examine in some 
detail the generative models and recognition densities that are featured in active inference 
under the FEP, emphasizing the circular causality between action and perception that is 
implicit in these formulations. Finally, in the fourth section, we present the argument for 
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enactive inference: generative models are control systems, and they are not structural 
representations.  
 
 
1. Statistical models as representations 
 
1.1. Generative models and recognition models in Bayesian cognitive science 
 
Bayesian cognitive science is an approach to the study of cognitive systems that has gained 
much momentum in the last few decades (Ballard, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1983; Friston, 2010; 
Rao & Ballard, 1999). On this approach, cognitive systems can be described as instantiating a 
form of Bayesian inference. That is, their physical properties and patterns of behaviour come 
to match (or infer, in a statistical sense) those of their embedding ecological niche 
(Bruineberg, Kiverstein, & Rietveld, 2016; Kiefer, 2017). The various flavours of Bayesian 
cognitive science – e.g., the Bayesian brain (Knill & Pouget, 2004), predictive coding (Rao & 
Ballard, 1999), and active inference (Friston, 2010) – furnish mathematical tools to model 
how organisms engage with their worlds (Lee & Mumford, 2003; Mumford, 1992).  
 
This framework is broadly Bayesian because it rests on the idea that, at some level of 
description, organisms encode expectations or beliefs about their environment, which guide 
their cognitive processes (Rao & Ballard, 1999). These beliefs have been formalised as 
Bayesian posteriors and priors. Bayesian priors in this context correspond to probability 
distributions that are parameterised or shaped by physical states, e.g., brain states and patterns 
of neural activity.2 Bayes’ theorem tells us how to combine optimally what we know about 
the probability of some unobserved state or hypothesis s , prior to making any observation – 
i.e., Bayesian prior beliefs, which is denoted ( )P s  – with what we know, given some data or 
sensory observation o  – i.e., likelihoods, denoted ( | )P o s . Bayes’ theorem tells us that the 
                                                 
2 Of note is that these beliefs do not (necessarily) pertain to propositional or subjective beliefs (Kirchhoff & 
Robertson, 2018). They are statistical constructs that bias action and perception, rather than beliefs in the 
philosophical sense, i.e., of propositions with satisfaction or truth conditions. Technically, beliefs are used in the 
sense of Bayesian belief updating or belief propagation and refer to probability distributions whose parameters 
or sufficient statistics are associated with physical states 
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posterior probability of some event, given some sensory data, is proportional to the product of 
the prior and likelihood.  
 
( | ) ( )
( | )
( )
P o s P s
P s o
P o
=  
 
The Bayesian claim that will concern us can be stated more specifically as follows: cognitive 
systems act as if they are inferring the causes of their sensations; i.e., inferring the most 
probable event or hypothesis, given the sensory observation.  
 
This kind of anticipatory engagement evinces a role for statistical models (i.e., probability 
densities), based on which the relevant predictions can be made, and adaptive actions can be 
selected. If the organism has access to a model of what states are the most expected, 
statistically speaking, then it can compare its current state to this model, instead of trying to 
evaluate how surprised it is relative to all its possible states. Indeed, this evaluation, which 
involves computing the marginal likelihood or evidence ( )P o , often turns out to be an 
intractable problem (Friston, 2010; Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018). Most Bayesian schemes in 
cognitive science suggest that organismic dynamics can be described as bounding surprise by 
‘guessing’ (i.e., approximating) how surprising their sensory states are, based on statistical 
models of their predicted sensations – hence the appeal to approximate Bayesian inference. 
These schemes are based implicitly or explicitly on optimising an evidence bound called 
variational free energy (Friston, Parr, & de Vries, 2017). We now briefly rehearse Bayesian 
inference to unpack these terms. 
 
In Bayesian cognitive science, the generative model (that comprises a likelihood and prior 
density) is said to be inverted to give the recognition model (that constitutes a posterior 
density). A generative model is a probabilistic model, denoted ( , )P o s , of how sensory 
observations are generated. It is a statistical mapping from hidden causes s , which include 
external states of – or causes in – the environment to sensory observations o . Technically, 
the generative model is a joint probability distribution or density over hidden causes and 
observations. We work with generative models more easily when they are expressed in a 
form amenable to Bayesian parameterisation, as the product of likelihood and a prior.   
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( , ) ( | ) ( )P o s P o s P s=  
 
The beliefs harnessed in the recognition and generative models need to be updated to allow 
for adaptive cognitive processes. There are several ways to implement belief updating. In 
Bayesian approaches such as predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999) and active inference 
(Friston, 2010), belief updating entails the formation of posterior beliefs about the causes of 
sensations, using approximate Bayesian inference. Technically, these (Bayesian) beliefs are 
referred to as approximate posteriors, variational densities, or recognition densities. The 
recognition model is the inverse of a likelihood model: it is a statistical mapping from 
observable consequences to hidden causes. This explains why forming a posterior belief is 
often referred to as model inversion, where: 
 
( ) ( | )Q s P s o  
 
In other words, the recognition model is an approximate posterior probability distribution or 
Bayesian belief that constitutes the organism’s ‘best guess’ about what is causing its sensory 
states (including the consequences of its own actions). It is called a recognition model 
because the model allows one to determine – i.e., to recognise – the most likely cause of a 
given observation. In contemporary belief updating schemes, optimising beliefs involves 
minimising a quantity called variational free energy.  
 
( ) arg min ( ) ( ) ( | )
( ) [ln ( ) ln ( , )]
[ln ( ) ln ( | )] ln ( ) ln ( )
Q
Q
Q
Q s F Q Q s P s o
F Q E Q s P s o
E Q s P s o P o P o
=  
= −
= − −  −
 
 
By construction, variational free energy ( ) ln ( )F Q P s −  is an upper bound on negative log 
evidence, which is also called self-information or surprise in information theory. This means 
that any system that avoids surprising exchanges with the world (i.e., surprising sensory 
states) will look as if it is predicting, tracking, and minimising a quantity called variational 
free energy, on average and over time. Variational free energy quantifies the difference 
between what an organism expects to encounter and what it observes, where observations can 
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be about exteroceptive, interoceptive, or proprioceptive causes of input. In this sense, it can 
be thought of as some generalised prediction error. On this view, all the processes involved in 
cognition, from perception to learning and action, minimise the difference between expected 
sensory states (given prior beliefs) and observations, which gives them the look and feel of 
Bayesian inference.  
 
This optimisation can proceed explicitly as in predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999), belief 
propagation (Pearl, 1982) and (marginal) neuronal message passing (Parr, Markovic, Kiebel, 
& Friston, 2019) – depending upon the form of the general model and optimisation scheme. 
Some schemes try to learn a mapping from sensory inputs to the recognition density, 
assuming the parameters of this implicit recognition model do not change with time or 
context. This effectively converts an inference problem into a learning problem – as seen in 
earlier formulations like the Helmholtz machine (Dayan, Hinton, Neal, & Zemel, 1995). The 
more general theme – that underwrites approximate Bayesian inference – is that we can 
convert a mathematically intractable inference problem into an optimisation problem by 
extremizing variational free energy (e.g., by minimising prediction error). Once inference is 
cast as optimisation, one can then associate the dynamics of any sentient system (e.g., 
creatures like you and me) as implementing inference, via optimisation through a process 
known as gradient descent (Friston, 2013). 
 
1.2. Generative models as structural representations 
 
In this section, we unpack the notion that generative models are structural representations, 
which is the critical target of this paper. We will focus on the most recent, compelling, and 
engaging defence of this claim, provided by Kiefer and Hohwy (2018, 2019), Gładziejewski 
and Miłkowski (2017), and Gładziejewski (2016). 
 
Generally speaking, representations are explanatory constructs that are posited in cognitive 
science to make sense of the capacity of a cognitive system to engage in intelligent action 
(Williams & Colling, 2017). In this literature, representations are defined as structures and 
associated dynamics that are internal to an organism – typically, states and processes of their 
nervous systems, especially their brains. What makes these structures special, and useful in 
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explanation, is that carry representational content, by virtue of which the organism is able 
engage its ecological niche though adaptive behaviour (Boone & Piccinini, 2016; Ramsey, 
2007). Representational content is what the representation is about – “that is, in virtue of 
what they represent what they do, or get to be ‘about’ what they are about” (Kiefer & Hohwy, 
2018, p. 2390).  
 
An increasingly popular line of argument holds that the relevant neural structures function as 
iconic or structural representations, that carry structural content. More specifically, 
structural representations operate via exploitable structural similarity (Gładziejewski, 2016; 
Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017; Hohwy, 2014; Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018, 2019). On this 
account, structural representations get their representational contents from: (1) their standing 
in a relation of structural similarity to the target domain, in the sense that the second-order 
structural features (e.g., statistical properties; O’Brien & Opie, 2004) of the target domain are 
recapitulated in, or mirrored by, those of the neural representation; and from (2) being 
exploitable by the organism or agent, in the sense that the information about the target 
domain encoded in the neural states can be leveraged by the cognitive system to guide 
intelligent, adaptive behaviour. This exploitable similarity relation is weaker than strict 
isomorphism, and goes beyond mere resemblance in that it requires that the encoded second-
level structural resemblance in question must be causally relevant to the behavioural success 
of the organism (Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017; Williams & Colling, 2017). Structural 
representations are also described (3) as detachable, in the sense that they can be used by the 
agent to perform cognitive tasks ‘offline’, and (4) as affording representational error 
detection – in a manner analogous to cartographic maps – which allows for coupled adaptive 
action in the world. This last clause specifies what is at stake in (1) and (2): representational 
error, here, refers to the idea that the user of representation can ‘get it wrong’. The structural 
representation, like the map, does not itself afford representational error – its use by the 
system does. 
 
Recent defences of structural representations in theoretical neuroscience have leveraged the 
resources of the prediction error minimisation (PEM) framework to argue that the generative 
models that figure in Bayesian approaches to cognitive science are structural representations. 
That is, proponents of structural representations argue that generative models function as 
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structural representations with representational content. A great summary of this view reads 
that predictive coding theory  
 
“postulates internal structures whose functioning inside a cognitive system closely 
resembles the functioning of cartographic maps. It might be said that on the proposed 
interpretation of the theory, cognitive systems navigate their actions through the use of 
a sort of causal–probabilistic ‘maps’ of the world. These maps play the role of 
representations within the theory. Specifically, this map-like role is played by the 
generative models. It is generative models that, similarly to maps, constitute action-
guiding, detachable, structural representations that afford representational error 
detection.” (Gładziejewski, 2016, p. 569, emphasis added)  
 
The claim, then, is that generative models are structural representations, which are 
implemented by the exploitable structure and dynamics of neural networks in the brain: “This 
generative model can be understood as a sort of brain-implemented statistical or Bayesian 
network…whose structure resembles the causal-probabilistic structure of our system’s 
environment” (Gładziejewski, 2016, p. 571). So, in summary, on this reading, generative 
models are neural structures that represent, stand in for, or act as proxies for states of affairs 
outside the brain in virtue of an exploitable structural similarity. 
 
Kiefer and Hohwy (2018, 2019) examine the way that the generative model and recognition 
model constructs have been used in some Bayesian cognitive science. They focus on versions 
of Bayesian cognitive science that leverage the variational formalism, namely Bishop’s 
(2006) variational approach to machine learning. Summarizing their view elegantly, they 
write:  
 
as priors and likelihoods of hypotheses are mutually adjusted in light of prediction 
error, a reliable channel of information transmission is set up between neural 
populations encoding sensory input and higher-level representations – an approximate 
recognition model. In the other direction, a reliable channel is also constructed from 
those high level representations back down to the sensory input layers – the generative 
model. Since sensory input drives a signal up through the hierarchy, which reaches the 
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highest levels, and then those high-level representations send signals back down 
through the hierarchy to the lowest levels, we can think of the overall network as 
learning a mapping from sensory input, through high-level representations of causes, 
back onto sensory input. (Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018, p. 2405) 
 
We believe this to be an articulate description of non-enactive appeals to the Bayesian brain 
and variational Bayesian principles. The outstanding question for us is whether this view of 
the generative model accurately describes these constructs as they are used in active inference 
under the FEP.  
 
 
2. The active inference framework 
 
2.1. Phenotypes and Markov blankets  
 
Living systems are unique in nature, since among all self-organising systems, they seem to 
maintain their organisation when facing environmental perturbations. Most self-organising 
systems dissipate the gradients around which they emerge: a lightning bolt, for instance, 
effectively destroys the gradient in electrical charge that gave rise to it. Organisms, strikingly, 
not only self-organise but manage to persist across time as self-organising systems (Ramstead 
et al., 2018). Heuristically, we can say that organisms expect to be in their characteristic 
phenotypic states; surprising deviations from these expectations must be avoided to maintain 
the system within viable (i.e., phenotypic) states. The FEP leverages variational inference to 
describe the dynamics within this space of states that can be cast in terms of active inference 
and self-evidencing (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2016).   
 
Variational methods allow us to do more than model brain dynamics. Recently, it has been 
argued that they allow us to cast living systems and their phenotypes as statistical constructs, 
in the following sense (Friston, 2010; Ramstead et al., 2018). The system tends towards 
occupying those states on average and over time – they are literally ‘attracted’ to these states, 
in virtue of their flow that is necessary to counter the dispersive effects of random 
fluctuations (i.e., to resist entropic erosion). (Technically, the characteristic states of an 
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organism constitute a random dynamical attractor.) This means that phenotypic states are 
frequented with a higher probability than others. It follows directly from this observation that 
the probability density over the space of possible states of an organism must have low 
entropy or spread.  
 
Active inference adds to the technical apparatus of variational inference the consideration of 
Markov blankets (Friston, 2013; Kirchhoff et al., 2018; Ramstead et al., 2018). The Markov 
blanket formalism provides an answer to the question: what counts as a system? A Markov 
blanket is a set of states that ‘enshrouds’ or isolates the system of interest in a statistical 
sense; see Figure 1. The presence of a Markov blanket partitions the whole system being 
studied (in our case, living systems engaging with their environmental niche) into internal (or 
systemic) states and external (environmental) states. The blanket itself can be partitioned into 
active and sensory states, which are defined as follows: active states are not influenced by 
external states, and sensory states are not influenced by internal states. The characteristic set 
or phenotype is then the set of expected or most probable states that constitute the system of 
interest; namely, internal states and their blanket. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Markov blanket and active inference. A Markov blanket is a set of states that isolates the internal 
states of a system, s, from external or hidden states s, in a statistical sense (for notational consistency, external 
states are italicised, while internal states are in boldface). In graph theoretic terms, the Markov blanket per se is 
defined as that set of nodes that isolates internal nodes from the influence of external ones, which means that 
external states can only affect internal states indirectly, via their effects on blanket states (Friston et al., 2017). 
Accepted manuscript (post-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Adaptive Behavior. Please do not cite this version. 14 
 
 
 
 
 
The Markov blanket per se is made up of sensory states, which are denoted by o, and active states, denoted by a. 
Adapted from (Ramstead, Constant, Badcock, & Friston, 2019). 
 
2.2. Surprise, entropy, and variational free energy  
 
The FEP rests on a connection between three quantities in the context of Markov blankets: 
surprisal, entropy, and variational free energy. The quantity called surprisal (or more simply, 
surprise) is quantity from information theory, which is a function of sensory states of the 
organism and measures the unexpectedness of a given state; namely, the (negative log) 
probability of a given sensory state being sampled. Under mild (ergodic) assumptions, the 
time average of surprise is equivalent to entropy (Friston, 2010). That is, assuming the system 
in question has robust features that can be measured more than once (i.e., that it possesses a 
random dynamical attractor), the average of surprise over time is their entropy 
[ ln ( )]H E P o= −   (Ao, 2005, 2008; Seifert, 2012). Entropy in this context is a measure of 
the spread, dispersion, or dissipation of systemic states; low entropy means that the system 
will occupy a limited number of states, compared to all possible states it could be in.  
 
Crucially, the Markov blanket dynamics can be formulated entirely in terms of a gradient 
descent on surprise. Heuristically, this means that, so long as the Markov blanket is in play, 
the system must move necessarily towards the set of least surprising states – to exactly 
balance the dispersive effects of random fluctuations. Note that this means that the necessary 
conditions on the existence of a system (i.e., a Markov blanket) can be captured purely in 
terms of surprise.  
 
Variational free energy gets into the game rather late in active inference: as noted above, 
organisms cannot measure the entropy of their states, nor how ‘surprising’ they are in any 
absolute sense – they are ‘just in’ a surprising state or not. To ‘know if’ states were 
surprising, they would need to evaluate an intractable number of possible states of being. In 
other words, they would need to evaluate all the possible states that they can be in (which is a 
truly massive number of states, given how many parts and configurations even a simple 
organism can comprise), and how surprising their current state is relative to all those possible 
states. This feat is, for the most part, computationally intractable (for technical details, see 
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Friston, 2010) – it either cannot be accomplished or cannot in a biologically realistic 
timeframe by biologically plausible mechanisms. However, we can interpret the gradient 
flows implied by the existence of a Markov blanket in terms of a gradient descent on 
variational free energy; thereby equipping the dynamics with an inferential interpretation 
(and associated information geometry) in terms of approximate Bayesian inference. The key 
move behind this interpretation rests on associating the internal states with beliefs about 
external states, via the recognition density: 
 
( ) ( )
arg min ( ) ( ) ( | )
Q s Q s
F Q Q s P s o

=  
s
s s ss
 
 
In other words, we treat the internal states as parameterising beliefs about external states. 
This converts approximate Bayesian inference into an optimisation problem that is ‘solved’ 
by the dynamics of internal states, given sensory states of the Markov blanket. 
 
Heuristically, variational free energy is a measure of surprise, that is often cast in terms of 
prediction error; namely, the difference between what would be the case, conditional on the 
organism’s ‘best guess’ about what caused its sensory states, and what it does observe. The 
concrete, material states and processes of an organism, in a sense, embody this guess. Unlike 
surprise, which only depends on states which the organism cannot access directly (the state of 
its Markov blanket and the state of the external world), the free energy is a function of the 
beliefs and expectations of an organism; i.e., a function of Bayesian beliefs encoded by 
internal states.  
 
2.3. Active inference: Variational free energy and inferential models  
 
In short, given a Markov blanket partition, it is fairly straightforward to show that internal 
states can be interpreted as encoding Bayesian beliefs about external states that cause its 
sensory states – and so play a central role in the construction of free energy, which is defined 
relative to these beliefs (Friston, 2013; Friston, 2010). The causes of sensory states are hidden 
from the internal states, ‘under’ or ‘behind’ the Markov blanket, given that sensory and active 
states separate internal and external states from one another (in a statistical sense).  
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To minimise or bound free energy means that the organism is optimising its expectations 
about (i.e., its Bayesian beliefs over) things veiled ‘behind’ a Markov blanket. When these 
expectations coincide with the actual posterior probability over external states, the variational 
free energy becomes equivalent to surprise. When they do not, free energy acts as a proxy (an 
upper bound) on surprise, in the sense that free energy will always be greater than surprise 
(Friston, 2012). This also makes free energy a bound on (negative) model evidence, because 
surprise is negative model evidence in Bayesian statistics.  
 
The partitioning rule – based on the dependencies induced by a Markov blanket – induces a 
simple form of active inference (Friston et al., 2011; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006); in 
virtue of minimising surprise directly via a gradient flow (i.e., the flow towards the least 
surprising states). This is a way of saying that internal and active states are directly involved 
in maintaining the integrity of systemic boundaries; namely, the Markov blanket. Active 
inference, in its basic rendition, describes the tendency of dynamical systems – such as 
cognitive systems – to implement a dynamics that minimises (on average) their surprise, via 
perception and embodied activity in the world. Active inference captures the idea that this 
stipulative minimisation is instantiated in a generative model and realised through adaptive 
action (understood as the enactment of policies that minimise expected free energy).  
 
In active inference, tracking and minimisation of expected free energy3 is a strategy that 
living systems may use in order to select adaptive actions. Regardless of the metaphysical 
status of free energy, if an organism embodies the belief that its actions minimise free energy, 
and if it can select actions on its basis, then that quantity has physically real effects – by 
virtue of its effects the action-guiding beliefs of organisms (i.e., policies). The expected free 
energy gives the organism the capacity to test the viability of its beliefs, since it tracks 
discrepancies between those beliefs and the way things turn out. In short, it is the beliefs 
about expected free energy that drives the selection of action policies. Organisms that are 
                                                 
3 Expected free energy is the same as variational free energy except that the expectation is taken under the 
posterior predictive density over future states and outcomes. Crucially, expected free energy is conditioned on a 
particular sequence of actions or a policy. This means, for every policy there is an expected free energy; 
enabling the selection of policies that minimise expected free energy or, more colloquially, uncertainty. 
Expected free energy is denoted by G in the legends for Figures 2 and 3. 
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equipped with generative models of the causes and consequences of their action can exploit 
the free energy construct and use it to their advantage. Organisms self-organise to reap the 
benefits of variational free energy, giving their behaviour appearing to resist the second law 
of thermodynamics, according to which entropy must always globally increase (or, more 
precisely, of appearing to resist the fluctuation theorem that generalises the second law to 
open systems in nonequilibrium steady-state).  
 
An important distinction between active inference and the Bayesian brain is implicit in the 
selection of actions. This follows because this process of selection rests upon posterior beliefs 
about policies; namely, how to sample the environment to solicit observations. In other 
words, something new has been brought to the table – posterior beliefs about the external 
states and actions upon those states. Defenders of structural representational interpretations 
of the FEP, of course, do also acknowledge the role of action in the scheme; see, e.g., 
Williams and Colling (2017). However, as we shall discuss below, their representational 
gloss on the issue is not mandated by the mathematical framework that underwrites the FEP.   
 
 
3. A tale of two densities: The generative model and recognition density under the FEP 
 
3.1. The generative model and generative process in active inference 
 
In this section, we provide the interpretation of generative models and recognition densities 
that is in play in active inference. The idea behind active inference, its Bayesian nature – and 
the reason it is considered a form of inference – is that the dynamics of living systems can be 
described as implicitly realising approximate Bayesian (i.e., variational) inference through 
the selection of adaptive action policies. Under the FEP, living systems can be regarded as 
instantiating a statistical (generative) model of their sensory exchanges with the ecological 
niche by realising a dynamics that bounds variational free energy.  
 
Variational free energy, and its minimisation in active inference, depends on two quantities to 
which the living system has access: its sensory states (or observations), and the internal states 
‘covered’ by its Markov blanket. The organism can optimise these quantities by leveraging 
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two probability densities that it entails and embodies, respectively. These are the generative 
model and the recognition model. These two probability densities have a specific form and 
function under the FEP. Under the FEP, generative models are not explicitly encoded by 
physical states. That is, they are not encoded by states of the brain. Rather, it is the adaptive 
behaviour of the system that implements or instantiates a generative model. This is a crucial 
point that differentiates active inference from non-enactive appeals to the Bayesian brain. The 
generative model is enacted; in the sense that adaptive behaviour brings forth the conditional 
dependences captured by the generative model; i.e., keeping the organism within its 
phenotypic, characteristic states. 
 
The technical term used in the literature for this realisation of a generative model is 
‘entailment’ (Friston, 2012) – and refers to the fact that the statistical model in question is a 
consequence of the adaptive behaviour of the organism. Technically, the dynamics (i.e., the 
action policy selection) of a system are said to entail a generative model when the system is 
organised to actively instantiate (through active inference) a pair of probability density 
functions4. These are the recognition model and the generative model per se. What this 
means, heuristically, is that the internal states entertain specific statistical relations to one 
another; such that they can be described as realising the inversion of a generative model. A 
generic generative model for policy selection is depicted in Figure 2 (as a Bayesian network) 
and in Figure 3 (as a Forney-style factor graph).   
 
 
                                                 
4
 Technically, the dynamics are a stochastic gradient flow on variational free energy that is a functional (i.e., a 
function of a function) of the generative model. This means, a sufficient description of any self-organising 
system is available in terms of free energy gradients that may, or may not, be expressed in terms of an explicit 
generative model. 
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Fig. 2. A generative model in active inference, represented as a Bayesian network. Left panel: Specification of 
the generative model. Technically, a generative model P(o,s,π) expresses the joint probability of sensory 
observations o and their causes s, π  – where s denotes hidden states and π denotes the policy selected. A policy 
is just a sequence of active states, from which the next action is sampled. The model typically comprises a 
likelihood term (the probability of making a given observation, given causes) and prior beliefs about the hidden 
causes. In this model, the likelihood is specified by a matrix A, which captures the probability associated with a 
given outcome under every possible combination of causes. Cat denotes a categorical probability distribution. 
Empirical priors (priors that depend on variables) relate to transitions between hidden states, which are encoded 
in the B matrix. Hidden states, in turn, crucially include the actions of an organism, which are determined by 
policies. Prior preferences over outcomes are encoded in the C matrix, and the uncertainty or ambiguity 
associated with outcomes given each state are encoded by the H matrix. The vector D specifies the initial state. 
This generative model is constructed for policy selection; policies will be selected if they are more probable a 
priori; i.e., if they minimize expected free energy G. The model is used to perform Bayesian model inversion. 
This is essentially the process of constructing a recognition density – an approximate posterior probability 
density that inverts generative mapping from consequences to causes, allowing for recognition based on 
observations (i.e., inferring the causes of sensory outcomes). Right panel: The generative model expressed as a 
Bayesian network. Such a network is a representation of the conditional dependencies between the causes of 
sensory outcomes. Open circles denote random variables, which must be inferred (i.e., hidden states and 
policies); filled circles denote observations. Squares denote known variables, such as the model parameters. 
From (Friston et al., 2017). 
 
 
3.2. Variational inference and recognition dynamics under the FEP 
 
Variational inference gets into the game because approximating the statistical structure of the 
environment involves guesswork and a few mathematical tricks, as it were. The organism 
does not have direct, unmitigated access to the generative process that produces its sensory 
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observations. The organism only has access to the sensory states of its Markov blanket (that 
is, to its sensory observations). In short, creating attractors in the joint space of ourselves and 
the environment is essentially a game of inference that is necessarily a game of probability 
and information as well. 
 
Mathematically, in active inference, the recognition density operates as an arbitrary 
probability density function – over external (hidden) states – that is parameterised by the 
values of internal states. The recognition density itself is defined under the generative model. 
That is, the value of internal states encodes information that changes the form of the 
recognition density (changes the ‘guess’). In active inference, through the realisation of a free 
energy bounding dynamics, the recognition density embodied by the organism comes to 
approximate the sufficient statistics of the generative process from whence the creature 
emerged. The dynamics enacted in active inference is therefore equivalent to variational 
inference, what one might call a process of ‘embodied inference’ (Allen & Friston, 2016; 
Friston, 2011; Gallagher & Allen, 2016). Since the internal states of the Markov blanket are 
those states that constitute the system, we can think of the extended phenotype of the 
organism as literally embodying or encoding information that parameterises a recognition 
density.  
 
 
Fig. 3. The same generative model in active inference, represented as a Forney factor graph. Left panel: 
Expressions for the belief updates enabling approximate Bayesian inference and action selection. In this figure, 
boldface denotes the expectations or sufficient statistics of hidden states in the previous figures. The brackets 
that figure in the action selection panel are Iverson brackets; if the condition in square brackets is obtains, these 
return the value 1; and return 0 otherwise. Right panel: Forney or normal style factor graphs are equivalent to 
Bayesian networks, with some important difference. In this kind of graph, nodes (the square boxes) correspond 
not to variables, as in a Bayesian network, but to factors; and edges represent unknown variables that must be 
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inferred. Filled squares, echoing the above, denote observable outcomes. Edges are labelled in terms of the 
sufficient statistics of their marginal posteriors. Factors are labelled according to the parameters that encode the 
associated probability distributions. Circled numbers denote the implicit message passing in the belief updates – 
as messages are passed from nodes (factors) to edges (variables). From (Friston et al., 2017)  
 
Posterior densities over external states are approximated by tuning the internal states of the 
Markov blanket. The internal states encode the parameters of the recognition density (in 
terms of its sufficient statistics), which is the organism’s ‘best guess’ about what causes its 
observations. These parameters are optimised with respect to a variational bound on Bayesian 
model evidence. This bound is the variational free energy. This means that by tuning 
expectations about the cases of sensory data to bound free energy, the organism is also 
maximising evidence for a statistical model of its own existence (Friston, 2010).  
 
‘Entailment,’ in this setting, is used to emphasise that a generative model is necessary to 
define the recognition model but does not have sufficient statistics that are physically 
realised. In other words, a generative model is defined stipulatively as a probabilistic belief 
that explains the realised recognition model (i.e., perception and cognition) and subsequent 
action (i.e., policy selection and behaviour). See Friston (2012) for a formal treatment of 
entailment. Thus, the generative model is entailed by the internal dynamics, while the internal 
states encode the recognition model, in terms of sufficient statistics (e.g., expectations and 
precisions). The ‘causal bite’ of the generative model comes from the fact that it plays a role 
in policy selection by inducing free energy gradients (which then guide changes to beliefs 
about action). In other words, generative models are normative models of ‘what ought to be 
the case, given the kind of creature that I am’ – they are realised physically through adaptive, 
belief-guided, normative actions that maintain the creature in its phenotypic states.  
 
In summary, in active inference under the FEP, the generative model underwrites the 
selection of adaptive action policies. We can think of active inference as a story about how 
these two densities, the generative and the recognition densities, interact and change, and are 
leveraged by the organism to engage in adaptive behaviour – a tale of two densities, as it 
were. Our enactive interpretation proposes that changes in the recognition density, i.e., 
alterations in the physical structure of the embodied organism, are controlled by the 
generative model, which selects which action policies to pursue on the basis of expected free 
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energy. In this process of attunement, organisms change their structure (through learning and 
perception) and the structure of the world (through action), such that they become consistent 
with the preferences and expectations about the world that constitute the generative model 
(Bruineberg et al., 2016). In so doing, the generative and recognition models become attuned 
to the statistical structure of the environment from whence they emerged (i.e., the generative 
process).  
 
 
4. Enactive inference  
 
In this section, we unpack the implications of the pragmatist view for understanding the 
relations between the generative model, the generative process, and the recognition model. 
According to our pragmatist interpretation, the organism embodies the recognition density 
and entails the generative model as a control system. We then formulate a direct critique of 
the claim that generative models are structural representations. We claim that to examine the 
role of generative models under the FEP makes it clear that they are necessarily distinct from 
the structures that encode or embody information about structural resemblance (i.e., the 
internal states). Simply put, on the assumption that proponents of structural representations 
are correct to claim that there are indeed physical structures that have the properties of 
structural representations under the FEP, they are incorrect to claim that the structures they 
identify as representations are generative models. 
 
4.1. Generative models are control systems  
 
A generative process couples the generative model of an organism to its environment, in a 
causally circular embrace reminiscent of the perception-action cycle (Fuster, 2004; Tishby & 
Polani, 2011). The generative process is what enables the generation of observations, 
enforcing the view that perception is non-trivially dependent on action. It is these 
observations to which an agent has ‘access’ to at any given time. The generative model is a 
statistical model of the generative process. Crucially, however, the generative model is 
distinct from the generative process (Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 
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2016). This is because the actual causes of sensory input depend on action (i.e., on a 
generative process), while action depends on inference (i.e., on a generative model).  
 
This means that active inference depends on priors that inform action, while action per se 
affects the hidden causes generating sensory states (observations). In this formal sense, the 
function of the generative model is to couple the organism to its embedding environment via 
the generative process, which, in turn, completes the perception-action cycle.  
 
Following Friston (2010), Seth (2014), Anderson (2017), we now argue that, under active 
inference, the generative model functions as a control system. The organism uses its 
generative model to operate policy selection, the effect of which is to keep the organism 
within its phenotypic bounds (i.e., the organism’s phylogenetically and ontogenetically 
specified set points). Living systems exist in virtue of attaining nonequilibrium steady state 
(for some period of time); their dynamics do not resolve themselves through a return to 
thermal equilibrium states (i.e., death), but rather, by the restoration of the system to a set of 
attracting states or set points (e.g., updates of the recognition model embodied by the 
organism).   
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Fig. 4. The action-perception cycle in active inference: A generative model and process. This figure combines 
the Bayesian network in Figure 2 and the and Forney factor graph of Figure 3. The Bayesian network here does 
not denote a generative model; rather, it describes the generative process – the environmental process, including 
actions of the organism, that generated the sensory. The two graphs can be linked to depict the action-perception 
cycle: the policy half-edge of Figure 2 is coupled back to the generative process – namely, through the selection 
of an action that then determines state transitions. The causal processes in the world (inside the red box) 
generate a sequence of outcomes, which induce message passing and belief propagation, thus informing 
approximate posterior beliefs about policies. These policies determine the action to be selected, which in turn 
generates new outcomes, thereby closing the action perception cycle in a circular causal embrace. The action 
that is selected by the process is the most probable one, given posterior beliefs about action sequences (aka 
policies). In this combined figure, we emphasise the circular causality of active inference by replacing the 
message labels with arrows. From (Friston et al., 2017). 
 
This is key to understanding active inference. Active inference generalises approximate 
Bayesian inference, since in active inference the objective is not simply to infer the hidden 
states that cause observations but, more importantly, to act in such a way that minimises self-
information or surprise (via minimising free energy) or minimises expected surprise or 
uncertainty (by minimising expected free energy). The reason for this is simple: active 
inference turns on the idea that it is action, upon which perception depends, that ultimately 
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minimises uncertainty about the external causes of sensory observations. Hence, action can 
be cast as placing an upper bound on surprise – and expected surprise or uncertainty. 
 
This is an important distinction between active inference and non-pragmatist appeals to a 
Bayesian brain hypothesis (e.g., predictive coding). In active inference, the inference is about 
sensory samples that are generated via action. In other words, the self-evidencing system is 
the author of its own sensations. This has the remarkable consequence (which we will appeal 
to later) that the generative model (in particular, prior beliefs) does all the heavy lifting in 
terms of structuring exchange with the environment. In other words, in most instances, the 
generative model is more deeply structured than the generative process describing the 
environment (unless we are engaging with someone else). This is particularly true for simple 
things like movement. There is nothing ‘out there’ that corresponds to the articulated 
movement of our hands, until it is authored by the organism.5 
 
On this view, active inference can be read as a new take on the good regulator theorem 
proposed by Conant and Ross Ashby (1970); see Friston (2010). Active inference tells us 
about the relation between a control system (the generative model, with priors over action 
policies) and a system being controlled (the organism and its adaptive behaviour, the actual 
actions undertaken in, and part of, the world). This follows from a pragmatist reinterpretation 
of the good regulator theorem of Conant and Ashby. According to the good regulator 
theorem, one system can effectively control another if and only if that system is isomorphic 
with respect to the fundamental property of the system that it regulates; i.e., if and only if it is 
a statistical model of the relevant properties of that system (Conant & Ross Ashby, 1970). 
The generative models mirror the structure of the generative process in order to control the 
behaviour of the organism. As such, generative models are more about the control and 
regulation of action than they are about figuring out what is ‘out there’ beyond the veil of 
sensory impressions, and representing the world (Anderson, 2017; Bruineberg et al., 2016). 
They enable survival, rather than tracking truth. They model the acting organism, and are 
used by living systems to modulate their behaviour.  
                                                 
5 See Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019, chapters 5 and 6) and Veissière, Constant, Ramstead, Friston, and 
Kirmayer (2019) for an account of how cultural practices can play a distinct role in organizing the manner in 
which exchanges with the environment are structured, and consequently result in embodied action, including 
perceptual experiences.  
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The role of the generative model is to guide action in a contextually sensitive manner, which 
signals that we ought “to shift our focus from how brain mechanisms like Bayesian predictive 
coding implement and maintain models of the world, to how such mechanisms enable the 
feedback loops that maintain attunement to the environment and support adaptive behaviour” 
(Anderson, 2017, p. 8). The generative model is vicariously realised – that is, brought forth or 
enacted – by the organism in active inference; the dynamics that is guided by the generative 
model integrates the partial contributions of model parameters embodied across spatial and 
temporal scales. The attunement of the generative model to the generative process is an 
indirect process that depends on the direct tuning of the recognition density embodied by the 
organism.  
 
In summary, the role of a generative model is subtle in active inference. The generative 
model itself never actually exists outside the dynamics – i.e., outside the adaptive actions and 
policy selection of the organism. Within the dynamics, in provides a point of reference or 
definition of variational free energy (or more precisely, a definition of the gradients with 
respect to internal and active states). Given that the vicarious realisation of the generative 
model (through a minimisation of variational free energy) can only be through action (and 
changes in internal states), we can think of the generative model as being enacted, and of the 
recognition density as being embodied.  
 
This speaks directly to embodied and enactive approaches in cognitive neuroscience, and 
provides a computationally tractable framework for the metaphors mobilised by these 
paradigms (e.g., Gallagher, 2017; Noë, 2004; Thompson, 2010; Varela et al., 1991). The 
notion of entailment captures the fact that the generative model is entailed by the dynamics of 
a living system under active inference (Kirchhoff, 2018; Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017; Kirchhoff 
& Robertson, 2018; Ramstead, Kirchhoff, et al., 2019). This interpretation of the generative 
and recognition models allows us to model the dialectic between embodiment (what an 
organism is) and enactment (what an organism does). The generative model is what the 
organism expects, and guides what the organism is and does. It is constituted by expectations 
about the consequences of action that are conditioned upon the adaptive preferences of the 
organism. The recognition model is the embodied organism, in the sense that the physical 
Accepted manuscript (post-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Adaptive Behavior. Please do not cite this version. 27 
 
 
 
 
 
states of the organism parameterise (embody or encode the parameters or sufficient statistics 
of) this density. Thus, the organism literally embodies the recognition model, and its patterns 
of action and perception enact the expectations of the generative model it entails. This 
interpretation allows us to evaluate and nuance representationalist conceptions of generative 
models under the FEP.  
 
 
4.2. Generative models are not structural representations  
 
The idea that generative models are structural representations rests on an oversimplified 
reading of these constructs, based in older Bayesian theories such as the Helmholtz machine 
(Dayan et al., 1995) and non-enactive appeals to variational Bayesian methods (Bishop, 
2006), rather than on active inference under the FEP. In active inference, it is the recognition 
density that – through active inference – synchronises dynamically with the niche, and entails 
the generative model (examine Figure 4 again). The recognition density is encoded by the 
variables that are updated in active inference. The generative model does not coincide with 
these quantities; since it relates the quantities the ones with the others in an inferential net. 
There is no warrant, mathematically, for the claim that the generative model encodes 
semantic content or structural information. The generative model does not encode anything. It 
is realised by the statistical relations between states of interest. Instead, the expectations of 
the organism, as they figure under the generative model, are brought about by the organism in 
a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy through active inference. 
  
Against representationalist interpretations, we emphasise the subtle, often missed point that 
the generative model is entailed by the dynamics (i.e., the adaptive behaviour) of the 
organism. The generative model manifests as a control system that uses exploitable structural 
similarities encoded in the internal states of the organism. It is not itself a representation, or 
anything like the vehicle of representational content. Conversely, the recognition density can 
be cast as having properties similar to those of a structural representation; in the sense that 
has been explored in recent literature on active inference and cognitive representations, e.g., 
(Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017; Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018). However, this only holds given 
that exploitable structural similarities are generated and maintained by active inference.  
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The structures that do encode exploitable structural similarities are the internal states of the 
Markov blanket, which parameterise a recognition density that the organism embodies, not 
the generative model. So, representationalists about generative models in active inference 
conflates quantities that should be held distinct – at least in the active inference framework. 
And this is the category error of these interpretations. Structural representationalism is correct 
in its ascription to organisms a set of internal (e.g., neural) structures that are apt to encode an 
exploitable structural resemblance, and which is used in the control of action.  
 
The twist here is that this vindication of a representationalist sounding idea is accomplished 
by mobilising the resources of its traditional adversary, enactivism. Under the FEP, the 
organism’s internal states do indeed garner and encode exploitable, action-guiding dynamics 
about environmental states, as the representationalist maintain. However, they are established 
and maintained through active inference; i.e., through patterns of adaptive action. And 
crucially, the generative model is nothing like these structures. It cannot be interpreted as 
representational, even in the weak sense of the proponents of structural representations.  
 
The philosophical implication of conflating the generative process and the recognition 
density, and missing their role under the FEP, is to misunderstand the role of these constructs 
in the free energy formulation. A proper understanding of generative models under active 
inference, we have argued, is that they are ‘what an organism (normatively) expects’ and that 
they guide ‘what an organism is and does’. The generative model is therefore instantiated by 
expectations about how the world should be, where the expectations are conditioned on the 
adaptive preferences of the organism. This means that the generative model is realised by the 
embodied activity of an organism. It also suggests that the generative model is a control 
system that uses exploitable structural similarities encoded in the internal states of the 
organism. If this is correct, it is an outcome that allows us to accommodate key insights of 
representationalist views of active inference, without having the accept the claim that 
generative models are structural representations.  
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Concluding remarks  
 
Although we have focused more narrowly on the active inference formulation in this paper, 
our target and conclusions ultimately speak to much wider issues: the status of one of the 
most central (philosophical) concepts in the cognitive science – representation. Crucially, we 
have argued that, contrary to non-enactive, brain-centred Bayesian schemes such as 
predictive coding, the Bayesian brain, and predictive processing, all of which have been 
articulated as vindicating the notion of structural representation, this particular reading turns 
out to be unjustified once we consider the mechanics of active inference under the free 
energy principle. Specifically, we have argued that the attempted vindication of structural 
representationalism in Bayesian cognitive science rests on a mistaken interpretation of the 
generative model and recognition density. Representationalists argue that generative models 
encode exploitable structural information about the world. Our analysis suggests that this is 
false. Indeed, in this paper we sought to underpin the claim that generative models do not 
encode anything directly; they are rather expressed in embodied activity, and leverage 
information encoded in the recognition density (which is an approximate posterior belief or 
‘best guess’). Assuming our conclusion is correct, our enactive inference proposal serves to 
free us from a standard, but flawed, philosophical assumption about the nature and 
explanatory basis of cognition and adaptive behaviour.  
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